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THE THOMISTIC DOCTRINE OF POTENCY:

A SYNTHETIC PRESENTATION
IN TERMS OF "ACTIVE" AND "PASSIVE"

Sommarium. - Sicut primarie dividitur ens in actúale et potentiate
distinguitur ens potentiate in potentiam activam et potentiam passiv
tur possi reduci omnes modi potentialitatis qui tractantur apud S. Th
« relativitas » invenitur in determinatione potentialitatum formae subst
humanae angélicaeque.

In St. Thomas' formulation, the study of potency is one
portant prerequisites to a study of being. And the reason
only being we have immediate experience of, is created be
being is necessarily potential being - i. e., in some way falli

perfection, and of perfect actuality. To understand pot

to understand the proper characteristic of created being. E
of God is essentially related to our understanding of the

being. God is " potential ", i. e., the Omnipotent Creato
because we are potential in respect to Him, i. e., create

moved to posit the power and superiority of God as Creato
we perceive the contingent and dependent powers and capa
And so potencja in God is neither an imperfection nor a l
unlimited creative power of God's essence, i. e., its perfec
We arrive at the concept of the " potency " of God only
from the potencies of creatures. Indeed, we could know n
potency, unless we examine created beings and their potenc
And it follows from this that the " potency " in God is no
as if in contradistinction to actuality: but only by way of
in so far as he contains in a pre-eminent way all created (p
and potencies. God's potency, therefore, is a paradox : It is
and is, indeed, identical with His fully actual essence. 2 In

hand, it is truly a " potential " potency.

In view of the importance of potency in via inventionis f
ing of both created and uncreated being, we might say that

division of being is the division into actual and potent
1 Cf. I De Pot., q. 1, art. 1.

2 Cf. Ibid.
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division truly and radically sets off created from uncr
only by the creation of complex being (i. e., being co
and act) that beings have become multiplied, and hence divided. All the
divisions and distinctions which we ascribe to being would be neither possible
nor intelligible unless there were some primordial complexification of being.
Let us conduct our inquiry into St. Thomas' general doctrine on potency,
by first highlighting the distinction between actual and potential being, and
then considering potency in its role as a principle of being.
A. The Distinction of Actual from Potential Being.

In the Aristotelian system, actual being, i. e., actual sub

must somehow be prior in the universe considered as a whole.
agrees basically with this, but adds that God is substance by wa
It would, ideed, be more accurate to say that God is a super su
perexistent, and that He contains the perfections of substanti
in much the same way that man contains the perfections of p
in a pre-eminent way. 4 To more clearly define what he mean
actual God who created all things, St. Thomas quotes from Chapter XI, 6,
of the De Divinis Nominibus of Dionysius:
We cannot say that the per se existent who is the cause of all things is some
substance, whether angelic or divine: but must rather aver that the principle and
the substantial ground and the cause of all the things which have been created
in nature-is itself a veritable supersubstantial existent. 5

St. Thomas, in commenting on this passage, concludes that this super-

substantial esse of God is substance only in the sense that it is as it were the
exemplar or form of all other substantial forms.

It is perhaps even misleading for us to think of God as an essence or

substance. For when we use such words we cannot help but visualize a receptacle or receptive potency. And there is nothing of receptivity in God. He

is, indeed, unreceived esse, unreceptive essence. He is pure and simple and

completely impassible: the final act, or actuation, to which all created passive
potencies are somehow ultimately ordered. 6
The created beings which are ordered to God in such manifold ways have
one thing in common: They are all potential in some way, in that, although
they already participate in a higher or inferior manner in the perfections of

3 Cf. Metaph. XII, 1 e 6 (1069 a, 107 b, 3-6).

4 Cf. De Subst. Sep., XVII, 93. A problem of terminology enters in here. If we wish
to attribute substantiality and existence to creatures, then we are constrained to say that
God has something more than this. It, on the other hand, we say that God is being and
substance, we must, to be consistent and philosophically exact, say that all creatures are
only quasi-beings, quasi -substances (i. e. having such names only by way of analogy).
5 Cf. Ibid. : " Non enim substantiam quamdam divinam aut angelicam esse dicimus
per se esse quod est causa quod sint omnia; solum enim - quod sint ex natura omnia ipsum esse supersubstantiale.... est principium et substantia et causa ".
6 Cf. In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1.
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God, they are still intrinsically orde
tinual preservation in the perfectio
Those beings which participate in

are the intellective substances. These intellective substance are subdivisible

into: 1) those numerous incorporeal species which in popular terminology
we designate as " angels, " and which are complete substances in full possession
of both themselves and their thought; and 2) the species of man, whose soul
is an incomplete substance which will attain to the full possession of itself
and of its thought only if and when it comes to a state of full self-comprehension in an immortal body, unsusceptible to further change or corruption.

There are also other beings which participate in a minimal way in the
supersubstantial actuality of God; which - in metaphorical terms - " have

a long way to go " in attaining to such actuality; but which can indeed advance
towards human intellective actuality according to a slow and ordered

progression. 7 And these are the essentially material beings : i. e, beings

whose substance could not exist in any way without matter. The potentiality
of such beings is a progression towards actuality, a progression which is never

quite complete, but always moving, always becoming. 8 And the potency

of such material beings is called " prime matter, " i. e., that first substratum
which must be presupposed as a receptacle for all essentially material forms,
and also for the incomplete substantial form of man, which depends per accidens
on a body for its complete perfection.
B. Potency as a Principle of Being.

Potency, whether it be found in material or in spiritual bein
an ordering to act, a special finite mode or participation in t
of God. And, if we analyze the connotation of the word,
we will see that is at the same time both an affirmation and
affirmation, is so far as it designates a certain degree of pos
which is possessed; but a negation, in so far as it implies tha

chasm - be it relatively great or small - between the perf

participant and unparticipated act.
There is an evident, easily perceptible negation or privatio
the "participation" of act on the part of generable and cor

for they all have some kind of a limited form or act, which is abl

by some other form; and the very phenomenon of change im
a negation, of the new form which is to be received.
But there is also another, more metaphysical type of privat

fore of participation, to be found in these same generable
beings: a metaphysical participation, a pure type of potency,
transcendent relationship which is found in every created

7 Cf. In XII Metaph., lect. II, p. 624 (edit. Parma): " Licet.... materia
tentia ad omnes formas, tarnen quodam ordine suscipit eas. Per prius en
ad formas elementares, et eis mediantibus secundum diversas proportion
est in potentia ad diversas formas ".
8 Cf. Abist., Physics , VIII, 5, 257 b, 7-9: The potential is in process
motion is an incomplete actuality of the movable.... ".
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material or spiritual. As St. Thomas says, even in corpo
deeper type of potency is necessary over and above m

Over and above this transistory mode of becoming, it beh
follow the opinion of Aristotle and Plato - to designate anot
type.... That is to say, over and above that mode of becomin
is generated when a new form is united to the matter - we m
more fundamental generation of things, according to which existence itself is
infused to the whole universe of creatures from that primary being who is existent
of His very nature. 9

This fundamental deprivation of existence in itself , which gives to a thing
the metaphysical possibility for receiving existence ab alio - is called in

Thomistic terminology, "essence". All existing creatures, in so far as they

are created and participant, must have some a- temporal ground for receiving
existence - a ground which becomes at the same time a mode of expressing
existence. And " essence " supplies such a ground.
This essence, indeed, gives complete metaphysical shape, and possibility

of existence, to a thing. And nothing would be able to exist, unless it had
the intrinsic form of transcendent potentiality which its essence gives it.
However, we must not make the mistake of supposing that essence actually
causes the existence of something, instead of vice versa. Essence has no casual
relationship to the existence it " receives, " except a purely material one.

In fact, as St. Thomas notes in the De Ente et Essentia , 10 we can easily think
of some essence without knowing anything about whether one actually exists,

or not. This is because of our human, analytic habit of breaking things up
into their intelligible parts, and then starting from the bottom, so to speak,
in the didactical reconstructions which we make of reality. But our reconstructions will never represent an actual thing in rerum natura , unless there is
a final mental addition of the actus ultimus , the form of forms and act of all
acts, i. e., the act of existence itself, or esse.

In a composite essence, the matter is not existentially actuated by the

form, except on condition that the form is itself made real and actual by the
actus essendi. A similar relationship to the actus essendi is found in the case
of angels, who, though they may be said to " be " their own form, yet cannot

be said to be their own existence. As St. Thomas states in the Summa Contra
Gentiles.

We find in the angels a composition, in that their existence is not identical

with their quiddity [quod est].... We have already shown that God is His own
subsistent existence. Nothing, therefore, besides God, can be its own existence;
it follows consequently, that in every created substance, the substance is one thing,
while the existence of the substance is quite another. 12

9 De Subst. Sep., Ch. IX, 48: " Ultra hunc modum fiendi necesse est secundum sententiam Piatonis et Aristotelis ponere alium altiorem.... Oportet.... supra modum fiendi quo
aliquid fit, forma materiae adveniente, praeintelligere aliam rerum originem, secundum quod
esse attribuitur toti universitāti rerum a primo ente quod est suum esse ".
10 De Ente et Essentia, IV.
11 De Ente, IV.

12 S. C. O., II, 52: " Invenitur in eis aliqua compositio, ex eo quod non est idem in
eis esse et quod est.... Ostensum est quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil igitur aliud
praeter Ipsum potest esse suum esse; oportet igitur in omni substantia quae est praeter
Ipsum, aliud esse ipsam substantiam et aliud ejus esse ".
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However, in the angels, as well as
the actus essendi is not self-suffici
possibility, presuppose some type
the reception of the act.
And so we see that " potency " in its most abstract and essential sense
is the material principle which makes finite existence itself possible. We shall
see in the following section how it also corresponds in a derivative sense to
other acts, or perfections, or aspects of perfections - than the actus essendi

itself.

C. The Primordial Types of Potency - Active and Passive Potency.

St. Thomas, in the beginning of his De Potentia Dei, differen
the two fundamental divisions of potency:

There is a twofold division of potency : 1) active potency, which i
ciple of that act which is called ' operation ' ; .... and 2) passive po
the principle of the first act, or form, of a thing. 13

St. Thomas goes on to say14 that active potency is the ca

" actions ", or operations, which are elicited from an individua

that passive potency is the cause of all the passivities and "

thing. He remarks that our notion of " potency " is derived fro
tion of act, and that we start out in via inventionis in ascribing
most overt operations, and finally end up in positing it as the
principle of the most convert " operation " - namely, of the f
stantial act of a thing (and thus this latter division of potency is truly,
as we remarked above, 15 potency in the most abstract and essential sense,
potency par excellensce).
An understanding of active and passive potency is of paramount impor-

tance for the whole of Thomistic ontology. The reason for this is that the
relationship of active to passive potency within a particular being or between
one being and another - serves to establish this or that individual being in
its peculiar and proper analogical status, within the whole hierarchy of creation. And all the perfections of a particular being are proportionate to this
ontological status within the realm of being.
Our next consideration, therefore, in this analysis of the general Thomistic
formulation of the doctrine on potency, will be given to the precise scope

and extent of these fundamental types of active and passive potency.
1) The Scope and Existential Ramifications of " Active Potency ".

The operations produced naturally by a being are called by St. Thomas
the " act of that which is perfect ", or the " act of a being in act ".
13 Loc. cit., 1, c: " Duplex est potentia: una activa cui respondet actus qui est operatio;

alia est potentia passiva, cui respondet actus qui est forma ".
14 Ibid.

15 Sect. B, ad fin.
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For example, the operation by which a separate sub
to various intelligible species would be such an " act

This terminology is meant to differentiate such operatio
motion, which is properly called the " act of being in

not flowing in the natural order from some state of actual

dy has, but infused into some " pure ", i. e., completel
The potencies which correspond to such operations,

of beings in act ", are the so-called " active powers

beings, these active powers are characterized as acciden
second species of the accident of quality: ontological qua
bridge the gap between a substance and its own operat
attributed to all creatures, precisely because creatures
mediately through their substantial forms. 19 (In G
who is able to act immediately through His simple and
active " power " becomes existentially identical with
While active potency in God is synonymous with th
all created potencies, and is, in its essence, a fait accom
creatures is a means through which their perfection i

complished - a principle discernible by the human
accurately describe the process which must take pla

of any concrete act. 20 We must presuppose some such
individual, if we are to attribute a concrete action to an individual as to its
source, i. e., its spontaneous initiator. 21

The power of action within a creature would seem to be able to be
best described as the ability of a thing to accomplish its natural or freely
intended end with a minimum of hindrance or obstacles. 22 For example, a

powerful fighter would be able to obtain more by brute strength than another

person. 23 But this power of action is neither self-sufficient nor self-explanatory.

It must have a root, a rational ground, in the substantial act, in the form,
of the individual creature. 24 As with every accident, it must be rooted in,
and caused by, the substance of a thing. 25 And in the case of an intellective
creature, we would have to say that the root of all such powers is the incomplete substantiality of the soul as the active principle of the human essence 26
(or, in the case of separate substances, the materially unlimited and uncomposed substantiality of the separated form27).

16 S. Th., I, q. 59, art. 1, ad 3.
17 Cf. In III Phys ., Lect. Ill, init. It should be noted that, in Aristotle's formulation
the form (first act) of a substance is also an " act of a being in potency ", in that the generation of any substantial form is immediately reducible to the " primary " locomotion i. e., the combination and separation of elemental particles. (Cf. Phys., VIII, 7 260 a, 29260 b, 14).

18 Cf. De Pot., I. q. I, art. 1.

19 Cf. Ibid., ad. 11.

20 S . Th., I, q. 41, art. 6, ad 1.

21 S. C . G. II, 60: "Item. Sicut nihil.... ".
22 In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1.

23 Ibid .

24
25
26
27

De Pot., art. I, c.
De Ente, VI.
De Virtute in Comm., I, 4, ad 3.
De Subst . Sep., VIII, 45.
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acts which can be produced by substantial forms are manifold, and since
there is a certain natural succession among the posited acts themselves, we
are led to discern different types of active potencies as immediately responsible for different " species " of operations.

In the case of creatures, we examine the multiple operations of which

they are capable, and the types of objects or concrete effects to which these
operations must correspond or must be related; and we thus come to arrange

the " active potencies " themselves in various genera and species. But in
the case of God (in whom there can be no separation of operation and sub-

stance) we are led to posit active potency from a study of His effects only, 28
and not of His eternal operation. And from the knowledge of His unlimited
effects and His universal providence, we rise to a rather tentative but nonetheless certain knowledge of His eternally-active omnipotence. The proximate
rational ground for this attribution of active potency to God seems to be the
principle that " there must be an active potency corresponding to every passive
potency ", 29 coupled with the realization that the whole universe of passive

potencies, taken as a system, must correspond to some single, simple, and

infinitely efficacious active potency. 30
While the omnipotence of God is intelligible to us only through consideration
of the dependent potency of the universe taken as a whole, the active potency
of creatures becomes intelligible to us through the various types of operations
and movements which take place in and among them.
By consideration of the directly perceptible phenomenon of self-movement
in living creatures, we easily arrive at the notion of the necessity for some
active potential principle to supply the basis for such motions.
The least perfect type of such self-movement is the phenomenon of growth

and alimentation which is perceptible in all corporeal living beings, and to
which we ascribe the corresponding active potency of " vegetation ". 31 The

most advanced expression of such self-motion is the phenomenon of selflocomotion, which we perceive in animals which do not have their food
immediately present to them (i.e., through the soil, etc.);32 and we correspondingly ascribe the potency of " locomotion " as the principle of such

advanced movements. 33

By consideration of other indirectly perceptible phenomena, we can also
arrive at the notion of the existence of a purely immanent principle of activity,
the active power of intellection. Our fundamental method in this case is the

method of introspection. Using the data given to us through the common
28 Cf. S. Th ., q. 25, art. 1.
29 S. C . G., II, 22: "omni potentia(e) passiva© respondei potentia activa".
30 Cf. In I Sent., d. 42. a. 1. a. 1.

31 Cf. In II De Ànima, Lect. III, 256, 257; and In I De Anima , Lect. XI

32 Cf. In VIII Phys ., Lect. XV, ad fin. " Probat quod.... also, I De Virt. in Comm.,

art. III.

33 Note that the potency of " locomotion " corresponds to a particular genu

while the potency of " vegetation " expresses the common denominator " sp
which is the modus operandi of all living things, qua living. Cf. In I De Ani

199-201; and In II De Anima, Lect. VI, 300.
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sense, imagination, and memory, and seeing by refle
activities of the passive intellect in the operations of
led to seek for the sufficient reason of all such interio
And we find such a sufficient reason only by positing
though dependent on external objects and external st

the movements which it causes, nevertheless its essence is autonomous. And

this is the faculty of intellect. In lieu of this faculty, we would be absolutely
without sufficient reason for the phenomena of abstraction and conceptualization; for our experience shows that these latter operations are not directly
proportionate to any external and material conditions which may give rise
to them, but rather go beyond these conditions.
Finally, seeing that the intellect is essentially autonomous, and only
connected per accidens with the various concomitant phenomena which take
place in man along with the more essential operations of these faculties, we
come to realize that such a faculty can, and indeed must, exist in a pure state
in some type of being. That is to say, there must be some type of being, or
group of beings, which understand without depending on external objects or
being subject to temporal progression. For, as St. Thomas says, " whatever

exists per accidens in any nature, is not found in all instances of that nature " ; 34
And he concludes that there must be some instance of the intellective nature

in which intellection is found without the concomitant phenomena of abst
tion, temporal progression, etc., for

in whatsoever genus is found an inferior exemplification of some perfection, th
must be present, within that same genus, a specific type or instance of the pure
and preeminent exemplification of that perfection. 35

As the bed of an ocean is indisputably the sine qua non for all the fluctu

tions and alterations effected on its surface - so also passive potency i
a very real way, the foundation for all the existential modifications whic
take place in, or through the agency of, a thing. Not only is passive poten
directly responsible for all the " passivities " in a thing, i. e., for each

every way in which it is capable of receiving perfection : but it is also indir
necessary as a substratum for active potencies, and all the operations to wh

these active potencies give rise. As St. Thomas says,

In a thing which possesses active potency in a dependent way, there must be
presuppossed some kind of passive potency to act as a receptacle for the active

potency. 36

34 Cf. S. Th., q. 51, art. 1, c. : " Quod accidit alicui naturae, non invenitur universaliter

in natura illa ".

36 Cf. Ibid.: 44 In quocumquo.... genere invenitur aliquid imperfectum, oportet p
stere aliquid perfectum in genere ilio ". It should be noted that in the foregoing ar
St. Thomas uses the words, " nature " and " genus " as if he considered " intellective "
and " non-intellective " as the fundamental genera dividing up all of being: so that, in this
usage 4 4 rational animal " would not only be a species of material being, but, in a broader
sense, a subspecies of the species of 44 intellective being " which itself could be relegated to
the broader genus of potential, or created being.

36 S . Th., Suppl. q. 35, a. 3 ad 1 (réf.: In IV Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, q. a 3): 44 In eo

qui habit potentiam activam ab altero, praeexigitur ad potentiam activam potentia passiva quae recipere possit potentiam activam ".
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It would be outside the scope of t
proportion which exists between a
stances. Suffice it to say here that
not grounded in some way in pass
sibility of existence. 37
If we prescind from the order of
selves to the sphere of physical an

of passive potencies in this sphe
in evaluating passive potencies is

which they are related. And prime
all material forms, all corporeally

material conditions obtain:

Prime matter is in potency to all forms, but receives these forms only in

certain order: For before everything else it is in potency to the forms of the el

ments; and then, passing through this state, becomes potential to the variou

other forms, according to the dispositions and relative proportions of those elemental forms which it already has. 38

Prime matter is thus the most passive and potential entity in the physical
sphere. However, if we look more closely at prime matter, we see that it is
not pure passivity, pure potency. It is always part of a real, composite corporeal essence; and therefore cannot even be thought of in abstraction from its
real corporeal existence. I cannot think of " prime matter ", and at the same

time entertain a doubt in my mind as to whether it has actual material existence ;

for by definition, prime matter is a principle of actual corporeal beings. The
size and type of corporeal being makes no difference. As long as there is one
corporeal being of any description, it would be meaningless to talk about a
" purely possible " prime matter, and to ask whether this potency has " yet "

been actuated.

However, if we transcend the physical realm of change and essential
ponents, and pass to the sphere of metaphysical components, we find
we can ask such a question about the essence , taken as a whole. For exam
as St. Thomas says in the De Ente et Essentia, Chapter IV, I can think
" phoenix ", without knowing wheter one actually exists or not. I can

abstract from the existence of an essence. The converse, of course, would
not hold true: I could not consider " existence ", and wonder whether it has
been determineed and made substantial. But such an abstraction would seem

to be possible with regard to the essence.

Essence, then, is the most ultimate of potencies, in that it is pre

that potency which corresponds to existence itself, to the first and ult
act of the whole being, to the very act of the form. The " essential " cha
ristic of essence is that it be receptive of existence. In material things
also subject to change: but this is not due to essence qua potential, but e
qua material.
37 Cf. infra, pp. 318-319.
38 In XII Metaph., Lect. II, p. 624 (edit. Parma): "Licet.... materia prima sit in
potentia ad omnes formas, tarnen quodam ordine suscipit eas. Per prius enim est in potentia ad formas elementares et eis mediantibus secundum diversas proportiones comniixtio-

num est in potentia ad diversas formas ".
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Besides prime matter and essence, which are tw

passive potency, we can also distinguish various accid
To this category belong all those corporeal capacities
a corporeal being passive in the physical sense, i. e.,

fection Thus the capacity of clay to take on new
the sense organs to receive concrete intentiones ,
appetites in man to be sublimated to the perfecti
through the vis cogitativa , would all be physical pas
to these physical passive potencies there are two i
passive potency in the metaphysical order; namel
which is potential to accidental existential perfection
the sphere of temporal change;39 and the will, w
appetite ", 40 is a " moved mover " directly unde
" unmoved mover " among human faculties - the
2) Comparison of Active with Passive Potency .

Although it is necessary to use the word " potency
active and passive types because of their de facto mut
theless a certain ambiguity may result unless we clear

way in which theyare related to one another.
Active potency, in all its forms, seems always to p
of spontaneity, of self-motion, of self-determinatio

the other hand, seems to be always conditioned from
types of passive potency seem to be dependent on ex
conditions for their actuation or for their perpetuat
the passive intellect in the sensible part of man's sou

intelligible form given from "above"; the slab of
39 Cf. De Subst. Sep., XIX, 113.

40 S. Th.. I. a. 81, a. 3. c.

41 Ibid., q. 80, a. 2, c. This seems offhand to contradict St. Thomas' th
operation of the will is the " act of a being in act " (S. Th., I, q. 59, art. 1
contradiction disappears, if we consider the will with regard to the various
it affects or is affected by: In the domain of execution, the will is an active
the domain of specification, however, the will is a passive potency; passive,
reception of ideas of goodness, or right and wrong, etc. from the intellect.
St. Thomas could not, however, denominate these two aspects an " agent will " and
a 44 possible will " - setting up a parallel with the case of the intellect. For the will is only
active with regard to human activity, only passive with regard to the intellect. It is not

a self contained totum of passivity/activity, as is the intellect.

42 The 44 power " of an impermeable metal to withstand any hindrance or obstacle,

which St. Thomas refers to in In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, would seem to be reducible to an
accidental form consequent on particular matter (cf., e. g., De Ente et Essentia, 6, where
St. Thomas speaks of such forms).
43 For example, among the intellective powers the will, although it seems to possess
a certain spontaneity with regard to external effects, control of bodily movements, etc., is

" passive " in its own context, the context of spiritual potencies - since it must always
be determined by the species of the possible intellect. Thus among the intellective powers
there is only one 44 active " potency - the agent intellect which functions as an unmoved
mover, as it were, in the realm of concepts and volition.
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D. Subdivision of Active and Passive Potency.

To conclude our discussion of these fundamental active and pas
of potency, let us examine some of the subtypes or aspects of po
St. Thomas mentions explicitly or implicitly, and which can be c

respectively, on the basis of their operative (active) or recept

orientation.

1) Subdivisions of Active Potency .

a) Universal potency may be ascribed to all those active potencies which
are of higher, i. e. more eminent, gradation in the hierarchy of potential being
Thus the angelic intelligence extends to all the objects which inferior intelli

gences encompass in their scope; and the active potency of God extends
all of creation, continually actuating it and conserving it in being. 44

b) Exemplary potency is the power of some ideal prototype to serve

as a model after which other things are subsequently or consequently fashione

For example, an artifact is subsequent to an exemplar idea in the artist's

mind ; and every created perfection is consequent upon the consummate per
fection of the Divine Word, which it mirrors in some finite way. 45
c) Absolute potency is the active creative power of God, considered in
precision from His will and wisdom, 46 insofar as it is absolutely capable of
creating anything which is not self- contradictory, e. g. a winged horse.
d) Ordered potency , on the other hand, is this same creative power of
God, considered in its de facto union and identity with His will and wisdom.
e) Natural potency is the self-sufficiency of natural powers to perform
certain operations, without any special assistance in the supernatural order. 4
For example, the agent intellect of man is self-sufficient to lead him to know
ledge in the light of first principles.
2) Subdivisions of Passive Potency.

a) Subjective potency is the capacity of an actually constitued substance
to be perfected and completed by its accidents; for any such substance, con
dered as a subject or substratum for accidents, is related to its accidents
potency to act. 49 This is not to say that there is any temporal sequence in
44 S. Th., I, q. 57, art. 2.

45 Cf. In I Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 1.

46 S . Th., I, q. 25, art. 5, ad 1.

47 Cf. Ibid.

48 Cf. Ibid., III, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3.
49 Cf. Ibid., I, q. 3, art. 6, c.
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the perfection of a substance through its accidents : but

of a being express fully those perfections which ex

way in the substance. In the case of a man who becom
ple, the new perfection which accrues to him is a resul

ment of some capacity present in his particular ess

of time which takes place in the attainment of this pe
the exigencies of human nature, which requires a tem
material principle, for its perfection. In the angels, th
" true " accidents (i. e., those which are predicable sim
to have taken place immediately (i. e., aeviternally)

their substantial esse. 50

b) " Obediential potency " is a strictly theological term used to designate
the capacity of creatures to be " raised above themselves " through the operations of divine grace.

c) " Positive " potency 51 is a term we might use to distinguish that

material principle which, St. Thomas tells us, causes the existence of a thing
by simply supplying a substratum for the form of that thing - as the mother
supplies the raw material out which a human being is generated. 52 As applied
to the sphere of strictly immaterial beings, the analogical " material " principle
would be the essence, which is potential to the reception of esse. 53
d) " Negative " potency , on the other hand, might be used to designate
the privation of other forms, which is caused by the coadaptation of the material principle to the single form which it has. This privation causes a corresponding appetite or tendency in the material principle, to pursue other forms,
which it does not have. 54 In the angels, who are immaterial and unchangeable
essences, the analogous privation would not seem to be any dynamic principle
of change, but simply of static non-identity ; 55 and there would be no corresponding natural appetite to possess all forms physically, but only the appetite

to be united to all things intentionally, i. e., through knowledge. It seems

to be of potency in this negative or privative sense that St. Thomas is speaking
when he says, in the De Ente et Essentia , 56 that, as we move up the hierarchy

of creatures, the superior beings have more act but less potency. For any
increase in actuality implies a proportional diminution of limitations and

privations.

50 Although we can mentally distinguish a certain succession of natural and superna-

tural beatitude, etc., this is not a temporal succession. Cf. S . Th., q. 62, art. 5, c and ad 2.

51 Although St. Thomas does not use the adjective, " positive " and " negative ", as
applied to potency, he does refer to potency -as- capacity in a twofold sense: sometimes
in such a way as to emphasize that it is a capacity for some actuation, sometimes in such
a way as to call attention to the fact that every actuated or fulfilled capacity excludes, of
its very nature, certain privations (although it leaves room for other privations, i. e., other
capacitie-for). In order to present the notion of potency-as-capacity with optimum clarity,
it would seem useful to make explicit the distinction between these two aforesaid aspects.
52 In I Phys., Lect. XV; "probat quod....".
53 De Subst. Sep., VIII, 44.

54 In I Phys., Lect. XV; " Ostendit idem....
55 Cf. John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus (Tome 2, p. 101): Tot
sunt praesentiae, quot formae praesentes, et similiter tot carentiae seu absentiae et priva-

tiones, quot formae absentes ".

66 De Ente et Essentia, IV.
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We should also note that, when
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relativity obtains. For example, su
of esse, bit active in relation to pr
with regard to all other human fa
mination of faith, which requires
as its prerequisite. But the cogniti
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which all other distinctions are subordinated - and which is itself the fun-

damental " relativity ".
Marquette University , Milwaukee , Wisconsin.
Howard P. Kainz

57 8. Th ., I, q. 55, a. 3, ad 1.
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